Counsel's choice not to seek a rape shield ruling was tactical, not defective representation, Scottish appeal court holds
The High Court of Justiciary refused a rape conviction appeal built on counsel's failure to make a section 275 application after the Supreme Court's decision in Keir and Daly. The defence of consent was before the jury, the court found the extra evidence would have added little to what they already knew, and the appellant's own messages were his biggest problem.
DMY v His Majesty's Advocate, [2026] HCJAC 49
- Court
- Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary (Scotland)
- Decided
- Nov 11, 2026
- Conviction to this result
- 1 year
- Sentence
- Four years' imprisonment, imposed on 14 January 2026
Appeal against conviction refused; conviction and four-year sentence stand The court refused to set the conviction aside. Other routes may remain.
What happened
The appellant and the complainer, both about 18 at the time, had been together for around six months. On New Year's Day 2022, after a party the night before, they were in bed at his family home. The complainer said she told him no several times, that he restrained her and had sex with her while she froze. The appellant said the sex was consensual. Two days later they exchanged Snapchat messages. She wrote that she never wanted to be in a position where she had said no to sex and it still happened. He replied that he knew he had done something really bad and could not forgive himself. At trial he said he was apologising only because she was upset. The complainer first told her manager, then her parents on 11 January 2022, and her father called the police. During those ten days she stayed in contact with the appellant: many calls, affectionate messages, a coffee shop visit and a trip for a tattoo. The jury heard about that contact from her, from the appellant and from his mother. Her evidence had been taken on commission in July 2025, which means it was recorded before the trial. The jury convicted in December 2025, deleting some allegations of force from the charge. The appeal argued that defence counsel should have applied under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 to lead further evidence of the couple's conduct after the incident, including consensual sex on 5 January 2022, and that the Supreme Court's ruling in Keir and Daly made that evidence admissible.
Procedural history
- Jan 1, 2022Alleged rape at the appellant's family home in central Scotland
- Jan 3, 2022Snapchat exchange between the appellant and the complainer in which he apologised for something serious
- Jan 11, 2022Complainer tells her parents; her father calls the police; a detective constable attends and later exhibits the messages
- Jul 24, 2025Complainer gives her evidence on commission, recorded in advance of trial
- Nov 12, 2025Judgment in Keir & Daly v HM Advocate on section 275 applications
- Dec 12, 2025Jury convicts the appellant of rape with the partner abuse aggravation, deleting parts of the charge
- Jan 14, 2026Trial judge sentences the appellant to four years' imprisonment
- UndatedNote of Appeal lodged alleging defective representation; trial judge reports; trial counsel Gordon Martin KC gives an Anderson response after the report
- Nov 11, 2026Appeal against conviction refused
The offence and its elements
Rape, aggravated by abuse of a partner or ex-partner
Section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009; aggravation under section 1 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016
What the prosecution had to prove:
- The accused penetrated the complainer's vagina with his penisnot disputed
- The complainer did not consent to the penetrationdisputed
- The accused had no reasonable belief that the complainer consentednot addressed
- The penetration was intentional or recklessnot addressed
- Aggravation: the complainer was the accused's partner or ex-partnernot disputed
- Aggravation: in committing the offence the accused intended to cause the complainer physical or psychological harm, or was reckless as to causing such harmnot addressed
The questions on appeal
- Was the failure to make a section 275 application defective representation, meaning conduct so unreasonable that no reasonable counsel would have adopted it?
- No. The court found the decision was a tactical one reasonably open to experienced senior counsel, and indeed reasonable. The complaint was in reality that the defence might have fared better with a different strategy, which does not meet the test.
- Was the appellant's defence of consent placed before the jury?
- Yes. The complainer was cross-examined on consent, the appellant gave evidence that the sex was consensual, counsel addressed the jury on the point and the judge directed them on it.
- Would a section 275 application have been granted after Keir and Daly?
- The court said it was far from certain. The complainer had already accepted on commission that she stayed in contact with, and loved, the appellant. That reduced the probative value of questioning about specific sexual activity, which would have been highly invasive of her privacy and dignity.
- Was there a miscarriage of justice?
- No. The appellant's written messages were, in context, a clear admission. Evidence of consensual sex a few days later would not have materially helped him with that problem.
The law the court applied
Defective representation
An appellant must show that counsel either disregarded instructions about what the defence was, or conducted the defence in a way no competent practitioner would reasonably have done. How the defence is presented is a matter for counsel's professional judgment. Showing that the defence might have fared better with a different line of evidence or strategy is not enough.
Grant v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 42, 2006 JC 205; Dada v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 21, 2025 JC 329; Ditta v HM Advocate 2002 SCCR 891
Admitting evidence of a complainer's sexual behaviour
Under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, evidence otherwise excluded by section 274 may be admitted only if, among other conditions, its probative value is significant and is likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, which includes the complainer's dignity and privacy (section 275(1)(c)). Evidence unnecessary to present the defence that may merely prejudice the jury against the complainer should not be admitted.
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 sections 274 and 275; Keir & Daly v HM Advocate [2025] UKSC 38, 2025 SLT 1253
Miscarriage of justice
The court takes an overall view of the circumstances of the trial to decide whether any failing caused a miscarriage of justice.
Brodie v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 147, 2013 JC 142; TH v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 46, 2026 JC 58
What the court decided
The appeal against conviction was refused. The court held that the absence of a section 275 application was the product of a tactical decision by experienced King's Counsel, not the operation of the law of evidence. That decision was reasonably open to him. The appellant's defence of consent was fully before the jury, who already knew about the couple's continued contact and the complainer's continuing love for the appellant. The ground amounted to no more than a claim that the defence might have done better with a different strategy, which is not defective representation. There was no miscarriage of justice. The court added that it was far from certain a section 275 application would have been granted, since the extra evidence had limited probative value and would have been highly invasive of the complainer's privacy and dignity.
What happens next: The conviction and the four-year sentence stand. The opinion says nothing about any further step.
Analysis
This is our commentary, separate from the court’s reasons.
The court reframed the question
The appeal was pitched as a case about the new law on rape shield applications after Keir and Daly. The court declined that framing. Nothing in the law of evidence stopped the extra material reaching the jury. A senior lawyer, who already knew what the complainer had said on commission, chose not to ask. Once that was accepted, the only route left was the demanding defective representation test, and the appellant's own counsel conceded as much at the hearing. That concession narrowed the appeal to a single hard question. The court also placed the trial judge's report in context. The judge had suggested the extra evidence might have mattered, but the court noted that he had not analysed the principles of defective representation, and that trial counsel's explanation only arrived after the report was written. The comment therefore carried little weight on the question the court actually had to decide.
Why the messages mattered more than the later sex
The court identified the Snapchat exchange as the centre of the case and gave two reasons, each reinforcing the other, why it supported the Crown. First, the appellant's reply read, in context, as an admission. His explanation at trial also differed from the line put to the complainer in cross-examination, and the court said the jury were entitled to note that. Second, the complainer's own message, sent two days after the event, put her accusation on record at a time when she still loved him, which strongly supported the credibility of her account. Against that background the court asked a practical question: how much more would proof of consensual sex on 5 January have helped? Its answer was very little. The appeal was not even argued on the basis that the later sex bore on consent on 1 January, only on credibility, and the jury already had ample material about the relationship continuing.
What it adds on section 275 after Keir and Daly
The court's closing remarks are a useful signal. Where a complainer has already accepted continuing contact and affection, the probative value of questioning about specific sexual acts falls, because the point the defence wants to make is already made. The balance under section 275(1)(c) then tilts towards privacy and dignity. Whatever Keir and Daly decided, this opinion shows that evidence of later sexual activity will not be admitted simply because a relationship continued. The court was careful to say only that admission was not a foregone conclusion, not that it would have been refused.
The defective representation hurdle
Scottish law sets a high bar for these appeals, and this case illustrates it well. The question is not whether the strategy was the best available, but whether it was one no reasonable counsel could have adopted. Here the lawyer explained his reasoning: he did not think an application likely to succeed even after Daly, he chose to put the appellant's position through the evidence of continued contact already available from the complainer, the appellant and his mother, and he recognised that the appellant's real difficulty lay in his own messages. Whether or not another lawyer would have done the same, the court found it a reasonable call. The lesson is that an appeal of this kind needs to show a decision no competent lawyer could have made, not merely one the appellant now regrets.
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Citations
- [2026] HCJAC 49
- Keir & Daly v HM Advocate [2025] UKSC 38, 2025 SLT 1253
- Grant v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 42, 2006 JC 205
- Dada v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 21, 2025 JC 329
- Ditta v HM Advocate 2002 SCCR 891
- Woodside v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 19, 2009 SCCR 350
- Guthrie v HM Advocate [2022] HCJAC 21, 2022 JC 201
- Brodie v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 147, 2013 JC 142
- TH v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 46, 2026 JC 58
- Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 275
- Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 274
- Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 section 1
- Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 section 1
Sources
This brief is general information about one case. It is not legal advice, and it may not reflect later developments. Read the full reasons and speak to a lawyer about your own situation.